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Abstract We consider supplier development within a supply chain consisting
of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. Because investments in supplier
development are usually relationship-specific, safeguard mechanisms against
the hazards of partner opportunism have to be installed. Here, formal contracts
are considered as the primary measure to safeguard investments. However,
formal contracts entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, particular in a
dynamic and uncertain business environment. We propose a receding horizon
control scheme to mitigate possible contractual drawbacks while significantly
enhancing the supplier development process and, thus, to increase the overall
supply chain profit. Our findings are validated by a numerical case study.
Keywords Supply chain management · supplier development · optimal
control · receding horizon scheme · dynamic systems
1 Introduction
Since manufacturing firms increasingly focus on their core business activities,
an efficient supply chain plays a major role in generating competitive advan-
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tages. However, suppliers too often lack the capability to perform adequately.
In response, manufacturers across a wide range of industries are implementing
supplier development programs to improve supply chain performance [33]. Ac-
cording to Krause [13, p. 206], supplier development is defined as any effort by
a buying firm to improve a supplier’s performance and/or capabilities to meet
the manufacturing firm’s short- and/or long-term supply needs.
In accordance with the relational view as proposed by Dyer and Singh [4],
activities of supplier development, in which firms convert general-purpose re-
sources such as money, people skills or managerial knowledge into relationship-
specific resources, represent a rent-generating process. Because specializing a
resource lowers its value for alternative uses, relationship-specific resources are
difficult or even impossible to redeploy outside the particular business relation-
ship [38]. Thus, firms may see resources committed to supplier development
as vulnerable to opportunistic expropriation [36]. Previous research has shown
that contracts, in terms of formalized, legally binding agreements that explic-
itly specify the obligations of each firm, are viewed as the primary formal
means of safeguarding relationship-specific investments against the hazards of
partner opportunism [1, 20].
Therefore, supplier development activities with high levels of asset speci-
ficity should be safeguarded with long-term contracts such that the initial in-
vestment pays off [18]. The drawback of long-term contracts is, as the degree
of uncertainty increases, both specifying ex ante all possible contingencies and
verifying ex post the performance of the business partner becomes increasingly
difficult [38]. Therefore, firms might be reluctant to sign long-term contracts,
which potentially diminishes the firms’ propensity to invest in supplier de-
velopment activities and thus impedes the manufacturer’s initial strategy to
enhance supply chain performance [25].
Given this background, the purpose of our research is to mitigate possi-
ble contractual hazards by dynamically extending the contract. In addition, we
seek to answer the following questions: How does the contract period, i.e. plan-
ning horizon, affect firms’ willingness to commit relationship-specific resources
to supplier development? Does receding horizon control offer a straightforward
method for dynamically extending the planning horizon, while simultaneously
facilitating value generation within supplier development? Further, how should
receding horizon control be arranged to optimize supply chain profit?
By answering these questions, our paper makes a threefold contribution.
Firstly, we formulate a continuous time optimal control problem characterizing
the supplier development investment decision. We conduct a detailed study,
showing that the incentives for firms to participate in supplier development
critically depends on the contract period. Secondly, given the fact that long-
term contracts entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, we utilize receding
horizon control and show that the supplier development process can be en-
hanced by dynamically extending the contract, see Sethi and Sorger [30] for
the basic idea of prediction based control. Based on this result, a one-to-one
map is derived linking the contract period to the optimal level of supplier
development (collaboration). The insight gained from these considerations al-
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lows to either increase the supply chain efficiency or to realize the same level
of collaboration while being obliged to a shorter contract period. Finally, we
present a simple strategy slightly modifying the proposed receding horizon con-
trol scheme in order to avoid pathological behaviour of the supply chain. This
allows to realize the optimal level of collaboration while avoiding unnecessary
transaction costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the related
literature is briefly reviewed in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 the basic optimal
control problem is described. In the subsequent Section 4, the dependence of
the control policy on the contract period is studied in detail. In Section 5,
a receding horizon scheme is proposed and analysed before the effectiveness
of the developed methodology is demonstrated by means of a numerical case
study in Section 6 before conclusions are drawn.
2 Related Literature
The topic of supplier development has received considerable attention from
researchers in the past two decades. Previous research has provided good in-
sights into the use of certain activities [32], the antecedents [13], critical success
factors [18, 34], and the prevalence of supplier development in practice [15, 29].
Supplier development have been applied in various fields of application [31].
Within the automotive industry, Toyota initially began providing on-site assis-
tance to help suppliers implement the Toyota Production System [27]. Other
manufacturers have followed this collaborative approach to develop suppliers’
performance and/or capabilities, including Boeing, Chrysler, Daimler, Dell,
Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, Siemens and Volkswagen [23, 26]. Typ-
ically, manufacturing firms use a variety of supplier development activities,
e.g., providing performance feedback, training suppliers’ personnel, furnishing
temporary on-site support to enhance further interaction, providing equipment
and tools, or even dedicating capital resources to suppliers [32, 35].
Empirical studies support that supplier development is a key factor to
attenuate inefficiencies within the supply chain and, thus, strategically con-
tributes to strengthen the manufacturer’s competitiveness [19, 28]. Benefits
resulting from supplier development include, e.g., improvements in cost effi-
ciency, product quality and/or lead time [8, 16]. However, Krause and Ell-
ram [14] note that firms’ success in supplier development varies. In particular,
relationship-specific investments lead, in general, to a more satisfactory out-
come. Further, Krause [13] shows that the firms’ propensity to participate in
supplier development activities is higher if a continuation of the relationship is
expected. Here, Wagner [34] adds that supplier development is more effective
in mature as opposed to initial phases of relationship life-cycles.
Although relationship-specific investments seem to be critical to the success
of supplier development, the application of formal decision-making models
proposed for assisting firms in contract negotiations in order to adequately
safeguard such investments have received limited attention in the supplier
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development literature [2]. Without understanding the impact of the contract
period on the firms’ incentives to commit relationship-specific resources to
supplier development, its return will be negligible, perhaps even leading to the
premature discontinuation of such collaborative cost reduction efforts.
The trend to utilize mathematical models in general and control theory in
particular in decision making within supply chains is clearly visible [9] and [7].
Here, model predictive control (MPC), also termed receding (rolling) horizon
control, plays a predominant role due to its ability to deal with nonlinear
constrained multi-input multi-output systems on the one hand and its inherent
robustness on the other hand, see [21, 40] for details. Consequently, MPC is
a well-established strategy to deal with uncertainties in supply chains, see,
e.g. [22, 37] and [10]. In this paper, MPC is first used in supplier development
to mitigate possible contractual hazards by dynamical extending the contract.
3 Model description
We consider a particular supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer M
and a single supplier S, in which M assembles components from S and sells
the final product to the market. We restrict ourselves to the linear price dis-
tribution curve p(d) = a − bd, which establishes a connection between the
production quantity d and the sale price p, in order to streamline the upcom-
ing analysis. Here, the coefficients a > 0 and b > 0 denote the prohibitive price
and the price elasticity of the commodity, respectively. This market condition
is comparable with an oligopolistic or monopolistic market structure, in which
a firm can increase market demand by lowering the sale price.
3.1 Basic model
It is supposed that the decision-making process is structured such that M de-
termines the quantity supplied to the market obeying the paradigm of profit
maximization. Note that we do not distinguish market demand from the pro-
duction quantity of the manufacturer because the market price is endogenous
to the quantity sold. Moreover, the supplier produces the components to satisfy
the demand d and thus does not decide on the production quantity. Because
the manufacturer’s goal is profit maximization, the production quantity d cho-
sen by M is determined by differentiating
d · (p(d)− cM − cSC) (1)
with respect to d and setting the resulting expression equal to zero, i.e.,
p(d)− cM − cSC − bd != 0, (2)
which yields the optimum production quantity d? = a−cM−cSC2b and the optimal
sale price p(d?) = a+cM+cSC2 . Here, cM and cSC denote the manufacturer’s unit
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production costs and the supply costs per unit charged by S, respectively. We
further assume that the supplier wants to earn a fixed profit margin r. Thus,
the supply costs cSC consist of the supplier’s fixed profit margin r and the
supplier’s unit production costs cS , i.e., cSC = r + cS . Similar approaches to
specify the supply costs have been proposed by Bernstein and Ko¨k [3], Li et al.
[18], and Kim and Netessine [12].
It is supposed that the manufacturer wants to decrease the supplier’s unit
production costs cS by conducting supplier development projects to increase
the market share if that increases the overall profit of the supply chain. To
this end, the sustainable effect of supplier development on the supplier’s unit
production costs cS is modelled by cS(x) = c0x
m, where c0 > 0 denotes the
supplier’s unit production cost at the outset, m < 0 characterizes the sup-
plier’s learning rate, and x defines the cumulative number of realized supplier
development projects. The latter is modelled as a time-dependent function
x : [0, T ]→ R≥0 governed by the ordinary differential equation
x˙(t) :=
d
dt
x(t) = u(t), x(0) = x0 = 1, (3)
with u ∈ L∞(R≥0, [0, ω]). Here, u(t) describes the number of supplier de-
velopment projects at time t; with capacity bound ω > 0 to reflect limited
availability of resources in terms of time, manpower or budget. Similar models
of cost reduction through learning have been proposed by Yelle [39], Fine and
Porteus [5], Kim [11], Bernstein and Ko¨k [3], and Li et al. [18].
The costs of supplier development are integrated into the proposed model
by a penalization term cSDu(t), cSD ≥ 0. Overall, this yields the supply chain’s
profit function JSC : u 7→ R
JT (u;x0) :=
∫ T
0
(a− cM − c0x(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu(t) dt (4)
for a given time interval [0, T ], which must be maximized subject to the control
constraints 0 ≤ u(t) ≤ ω, t ∈ [0, T ), and the system dynamics (3). The contract
period T is of particular interest since investments into the cost structure of the
supply chain require their amortization during the runtime of the contractual
agreement. A summary of the parameters is given in Table 1.
Symbol Description Value
T Contract period 60
a Prohibitive price 200
b Price elasticity 0.01
cM Variable cost per unit (M) 70
c0 Variable cost per unit (S) 100
r Fixed profit margin (S) 15
cSD Supplier development cost per unit 100000
ω Resource availability 1
m learning rate -0.1
Table 1 List of Parameter
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3.2 Solution of the Optimal Control Problem
Pontryagin’s maximum principle, see, e.g. Lee and Marcus [17], is used anal-
ogously to Kim [11] to solve the optimal control problem introduced in the
preceding subsection. To formulate the necessary optimality conditions, we
require the so-called Hamiltonian H, which is defined as
H(x, u, λ) :=
(a− cM − c0xm)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu+ λu. (5)
From the necessary conditions, we obtain the system dynamics
x˙?(t) = Hλ(x
?(t), u?(t), λ(t)) = u?(t),
the so-called adjoint λ : [0, T ]→ R, which is characterized by
λ˙(t) = −Hx(x?(t), u?(t), λ(t)) = mc0x
?(t)m−1(a− cM − c0x?(t)m)
2b
, (6)
and the transversality condition
λ(T ) = 0. (7)
The solution u? : [0, T ) → [0, ω] of the optimal control problem exhibits
the structural property
u?(t) :=
{
ω if t < t?
0 if t ≥ t? (8)
depending on the (optimal) switching time t? ∈ [0, T ], which is characterized
by the equation
mc0(x0 + ωt
?)m−1(a− cM − c0(x0 + ωt?)m)
2b
=
cSD
(t? − T ) . (9)
In the following, (9) is called switching condition. Indeed, since the cost func-
tion is (strictly) convex and the system dynamics are governed by a linear
ordinary differential equation, it can be shown that this condition is necessary
and sufficient for the considered problem, see [24] for a detailed derivation.
The optimal value function VT (x0) of the problem under consideration
reads
VT (x0) := sup
u∈L∞([0,T ),[0,ω])
JSCT (u;x0)
where the expression on the right hand side is maximized subject to x˙(t) =
u(t), x(0) = x0. VT : R>0 → R maps the initial value x0 to the optimal
value. The index T indicates the contract period and can be considered as a
parameter — an interpretation, which is crucial for the upcoming analysis.
Evidently, investments (in the cost structure) pay off in the long run: While
all the effort is spent directly at the beginning of the collaboration, the result-
ing cost decreasing effect is exploited during the remainder of the contract
period.
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Remark 1 At the switching time t? the marginal revenue of further investments
in supplier development (given by the adjoint variable λ) equals the marginal
costs (given by cSD) as indicated in Figure 1. This reasoning is expressed by
the switching condition (9).
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Fig. 1 The adjoint λ : [0, T ]→ R≥0 computed based on the parameters given in Table 1.
4 Interplay of Switching Time and Contract Period
The contract between manufacturer M and supplier S ranges over the inter-
val [0, T ]. Realistically, two cases can be distinguished:
• The (optimal) switching time is given by t? = 0 meaning that investments
in supplier development do not pay off during the contract period.
• A switching time t? > 0 represents the scenario where investing into sup-
plier development amortizes during the contract period.
Within this paper, we focus on the second case. Here, from the specific struc-
ture (8) of the optimal control function we can conclude that all investments
up to time t? pay off during the contract period. Then, taking into account
the already reduced supply costs given by cSC(t) = r + c0x(t
?)m with
c0x(t
?)m = c0
(
x0 +
∫ t?
0
u?(s) dt
)m
= c0(1 + ωt
?)m,
further effort in terms of u(t) > 0, t ∈ [t?, T ), does not lead to an increased
profit. The latter holds true since cost reduction efforts after t? do not amortize
within the remaining time interval of at most length T − t? and are, thus, not
economically reasonable. We show that a prolongation of the contract period
yields an augmentation of the investments in supplier development, which
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corresponds to an increased switching time t?. A proof of Lemma 1 is given in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the contract period T is chosen (long enough) such
that t? = t?(T ) > 0 holds. In addition, let the condition
(1−m)(a− cM − c0) + c0m ≥ 0 (10)
hold. Then prolonging the contract period T , T > T , implies a strictly larger
switching time t? = t?(T ), i.e., t?(T ) > t?(T ).
Remark 2 The assumptions of Lemma 1 imply the inequality a−cM−c0−r > 0
as a by-product because the manufacturer cannot realize a profit per unit sold
otherwise (prohibitive price is greater than the production cost per unit at
time t = 0 from the manufacturer’s point of view). Hence, the seemingly tech-
nical Condition (10) links the supplier’s production costs c0 with the difference
of profit per unit a−cM−c0 by the learning rate m. Note that the assumptions
of Lemma 1 can be easily verified for a given dataset of parameters.
Lemma 1 shows that investments in supplier development are extended if the
contract period is prolonged. Hence, the collaboration continues after the pre-
viously determined switching time t?. As a result, the supplier’s unit produc-
tion costs are further decreased, the quantity offered is increased and the sup-
ply chain profit per time unit grows. The argument, that a longer contract pe-
riod leads to larger switching times, can also be validated numerically as visu-
alized in Figure 2. Here, we observe that the supply costs cSC(t) = r+c0x(t)
m
are further reduced if both the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a longer
contract period. The relation between the contract period T and the optimal
switching time t?(T ) is almost linear.1
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Fig. 2 Optimal switching time t? = t?(T ) in dependence of the length of the contract
T = T + i ·∆T (T = 60, ∆T = 3 and i = 0, 1, . . . , 7).
1 Indeed, the slope of the curve is slightly increasing.
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In summary and according to the initial question how does the contract
period, i.e. planning horizon, affect firms’ willingness to commit relationship-
specific resources to supplier development, the findings show that the supply
chain partners’ incentives to commit relationship-specific resources, i.e. to in-
vest in cost reduction efforts, critically depends on the length of the contract
period.
5 Successive Prolongation of the Contract Period
The benefits of an increased switching time come along with the inflexibility
resulting from long-term contracts. In this section, we propose a methodology
for assisting supply chain partners in contract negotiations to achieve the ben-
efits of long-term contracts while rendering the collaboration time invariant.
To this end, it is assumed that the manufacturer and the supplier are only
content to make contracts of length T . If the collaboration is successful for
a certain amount of time [0, ∆T ), ∆T ≤ t?, they might agree to renew the
contract on the time interval [∆T, T +∆T ].
Before we continue the discussion, let us briefly sketch the computation
of the (optimal) control function u? : [∆T, T + ∆T ) → [0, ω]. Here, the
profit function has to be maximized based on the new (initial) state x(∆T ),
i.e., JSCT (·;x(∆T )) is considered. Since ∆T ≤ t? holds by assumption, the new
initial state x(∆T ) is given by
x(∆T ) = x(0) +
∫ ∆T
0
u?(s) dt = x0 +∆T · ω (11)
in view of Property (8). Hence, the profit on the new contract period [∆T, T +
∆T ] is determined by maximizing
JT (u;x(∆T )) =
∫ T
0
(a− cM − c0x˜(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu(t) dt
subject to u(t) ∈ [0, ω], t ∈ [0, T ) and the differential equation (3) with ini-
tial condition x˜(0) = x(∆T ) = x0 + ω∆T . Here, we used the notation x˜ to
distinguish the previously computed (state) trajectory x(·;x0) and its counter-
part x˜(·;x(∆T )) depending on the new initial condition x(∆T ). Another op-
tion is to use the time invariance of the linear differential equation x˙(t) = u(t),
which allows to rewrite the profit functional as∫ T+∆T
∆T
(a− cM − c0x(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu(t) dt
with initial value x(∆T ) given by (11) at initial time ∆T . We point out that
the resulting trajectory deviates from the previously computed one already
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before time T . In conclusion, the implemented control strategy on [0, T +∆T )
is given by
u(t) :=
{
u?(t) maximizing JSCT (·;x0) t ∈ [0, ∆T )
u?(t) maximizing JSCT (·;x(∆T )) t ≥ ∆T
, (12)
i.e., the first piece of the old policy concatenated with the newly negotiated
strategy. This strategy yields an optimal policy on the time span [0, T +∆T ).
Hence, the same overall supply chain profit is reached without the hazards of
being committed already at the beginning (time 0) as shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Let the optimal switching time t? determined by Condition (9)
be strictly greater than zero. Furthermore, let ∆T , ∆T < t?, be given. Then,
the control strategy defined in (12) and the corresponding supply chain profit
on [0, T +∆T ] equal their counterparts obtained by maximizing JT+∆T (u;x0)
with respect to u : [0, T +∆T )→ [0, ω]
Proof : Since the profit JT+∆T (u;x0) on the considered time interval [0, T +
∆T ] with u from (12) is the sum of
∫ ∆T
0
(a− cM − c0x(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDω dt
and
+
∫ T+∆T
∆T
(a− cM − c0x(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu(t) dt,
the dynamic programming principle yields the equality
JT+∆T (u;x0) = VT+∆T (x0),
which completes the proof. uunionsq
5.1 Receding Horizon Control
The idea of an iterative prolongation of collaboration contracts can be algo-
rithmically formalized as receding horizon control (RHC) also known as model
predictive control.
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Algorithm 1 Receding Horizon Control Scheme
Given: contract period T , time step ∆T .
Set t := 0.
1. Measure the current state xˆ := x(t).
2. Compute the optimal switching time t? by solving the switching condition with xˆ instead
of x0, i.e.
mc0(xˆ+ ωt
?)m−1(a− cM − c0(xˆ+ ωt?)m) = 2bcSD
t? − T .
3. Set
u?(s) :=
{
ω for t ≤ s < min{t+ t?, t+∆T}
0 for min{t+∆T, t+ t?} ≤ s ≤ t+∆T . (13)
4. Apply u?(s) for s ∈ [t, t+∆T ). Set t = t+∆T and go to Step (1).
Upon start, the manufacturer M and the supplier S agree on a collab-
oration for a given contract period of length T . Firstly, the status quo —
represented by xˆ — is analysed. Secondly, the optimal switching time t? is
computed based on the initial state xˆ and T , cf. Step (2). This yields the
optimal control strategy defined by (13), of which the first piece u?|[0,∆T ) is
applied. Then, the manufacturer and the supplier meet again at time t+∆T to
negotiate a new contract. This initiates the process again, i.e. the previously
described steps are repeated, which is referred to as receding horizon principle.
Note that since the underlying system dynamics are time invariant, the newly
(measured) initial state xˆ represents all information required. In particular,
no knowledge regarding the previously applied control is needed to solve the
adapted switching condition of Step (2) with respect to t?. Figure 3 illustrates
the outcome of Algorithm 1 with prediction horizon T = 60 (contract period)
and control horizon ∆T = 3 (time step) based on the parameters given in
Table 1.
0 5 10 15
 
Time t and corresponding switching time t⋆
Fig. 3 Application of Algorithm 1 to compute the optimal switching times for T = 60 and
changing initial conditions xˆ. The lengths of the collaboration intervals are decreasing.
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Firstly (t = 0), the original optimal control problem is solved resulting in
t? ≈ 9.21. Then, u? ≡ ω is applied on the time interval [0, ∆T ). Secondly
(t = ∆T ), the collaboration is prolonged to t? ≈ 9.74. Thirdly (t = 2∆T ), the
switching time is shifted to t? ≈ 10.27. Still, t = 3∆T ≤ t? holds. Hence, the
(measured) initial state xˆ is given by x0 + tω = x0 + 3∆Tω. Here, Step (2)
of Algorithm (1) yields t? ≈ 10.79, i.e. the collaboration stops within the
time frame [t, t + ∆T ). If the RHC scheme is further applied, there occur
collaboration intervals of shrinking length.
As already discussed in Section 5, if the contract is not renewed, u?(t) is
set to zero for t ≥ t? ≈ 9.21. In contrast to that, the RHC scheme prolongs the
collaboration and, thus, increases the supply chain profit. To be more precise,
the profit generated by Algorithm 1 on [0, T + i∆T ], i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T/∆T},
T/∆T+i−1∑
k=0
∫ (k+1)∆T
k∆T
(a− cM − c0x(t)m)2 − r2
4b
− cSDu(t) dt
is greater than its counterpart JT (u
?, x0)+Vi∆T (x
?(T )) consisting of the maxi-
mum of the original cost function VT (x0) = JT (u
?, x0) and a second (optimally
operated) contract on [T, T + i∆T ] based on the reached cost structure repre-
sented by x?(T ) = x0 + t
?ω ≈ x0 + 9.21ω = 10.21. In particular, this assertion
holds in comparison to simply sticking to the cost structure based on t?(T ),
i.e.
JT (u
?, x0) +
∫ T+i∆T
T
(a− cM − c0x(t?(T ))m)2 − r2
4b
dt. (14)
While an increased switching time t? may already increase the profitability
within a supply chain during the considered time span, the achieved cost re-
duction sustains. Hence, if the collaboration between the manufacturer and
the supplier lasts, the obtained effect is a sustainable one.
In summary and referring to the question how does receding horizon control
offer a straightforward method for dynamically extending the planning horizon,
the findings show that dynamically extending contracts enhances the supplier
development process, because value generation is facilitated while both the
manufacturer and the supplier gain flexibility due to shorter contract periods.
5.2 Optimal Point of Collaboration
As observed in Figure 3, the collaboration can stop within the time inter-
val [t, t+∆T ) meaning that the prerequisite ∆T ≤ t? is no longer satisfied at
time t. This leads to a sequence of collaboration times of shrinking length. Sum-
ming up all of these intervals on the infinite horizon yields a total collaboration
time of approximately 11.18 time units. Hence, the total collaboration time
is increased by 21.3%. However, since the collaboration intervals are becom-
ing comparably short, implementing this strategy may be impracticable. Here,
we propose two remedies: If the new collaboration period at time t = k∆T ,
i.e. t? − t, is below a certain threshold value,
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1. set t? = t in order to save negotiation costs, which would probably outweigh
the achievable earning growth. For the presented example, the supplier
development program stops at 10.79 (still an increase of approximately
17.2%) if the threshold is 1.
2. measure the current state xˆ = x(t) and compute the optimal cost structure
for contract periods of length T by solving
mc0T x¯
m−1(a− cM − c0x¯m) + 2bcSD = 0
with respect to x¯. Then, set t? = t+ (x¯− xˆ)/ω. In the considered example
at time t = 4∆T , the measured state is xˆ = 10.79 while x¯ ≈ 11.18. Hence,
a collaboration of length 0.39 time units is fixed. At all upcoming time in-
stants, t? = t holds because the optimal cost structure for contract periods
of length T = 60 is already reached.
Clearly, the threshold should be chosen such that the profit increase outweighs
the negotiation costs.
Thus, Algorithm 1 allows both the manufacturer and the supplier to pro-
long their supplier development program without binding themselves for a
time span longer than T and, thus, provides more flexibility.
Remark 3 Algorithm 1 is a simplified version. Indeed, the time step ∆T may
vary in time, e.g. longer time steps in the beginning (for example ∆T = t? in
the considered setting), and shorter ones lateron. For details on so called time
varying control horizon we refer to [6].
In summary and with regard to the question how should receding horizon
control be arranged to optimize supply chain profit, two strategies are presented
in order to make the proposed receding horizon scheme, cf. Algorithm 1, ap-
plicable even if negotiation costs are taken into account.
6 Numerical Results
As seen in the previous section, applying the receding horizon Algorithm 1
dynamically extends the collaboration within the supply chain and, thus, gen-
erates additional profit within the supply chain. Next, we conduct a numerical
case study to obtain further managerial insights.
To this end, we compare the outcome J?? of the proposed algorithm based
on the second option presented in Subsection 5.2 and the supply chain profit
resulting from the control
u(t) =
{
ω for t < t?(T )
0 for t ≥ t?(T ) (15)
on the time interval [0, 2T ] = [0, 120]. The control policy (15) results from
the basic optimal control problem considered on [0, 60] and, then, utilizing
the achieved cost structure cSC(t) = x0 + t
?ω on [60, 120] without further
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investments in supplier development. The corresponding profit is given by
(14).
To fully understand the impact of receding horizon control on the supply
chain profit in depth, we first vary the following parameters of Table 1
a ∈ {192.5, 195, 197.5, 200, 202.5, 205, 207.5},
b ∈ {0.007, 0.008, 0.009, 0.01, 0.011, 0.012, 0.013},
cSD ∈ {70000, 80000, 90000, 100000, 110000, 120000, 130000},
ω ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3},
m ∈ {−0.13,−0.12,−0.11,−0.1,−0.09,−0.08,−0.07}
resulting in a total number of 75 = 16807 instances. For each parameter
combination we then evaluate the respective profits.
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Profit increase ratio (%)
Fig. 4 Profit increase ratio in percent.
The depicted histogram in Figure 4 shows the absolute frequency with
which a percentage of profit increase is observed within our parameter set.
The mean value is 3.36% with a standard deviation of 1.06%. In conclusion,
receding horizon control significantly improvement the profitability of the con-
sidered supply chain.
Second, we are interested in the interplay of the supplier’s learning rate m
and receding horizon control. Thus, based on the parameters of Table 1, we
perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter m with
m ∈ {−0.15,−0.14,−0.13,−0.12,−0.11,−0.1,−0.09,−0.08,−0.07,−0.06,−0.05}.
Applying Algorithm 1 (T = 60, ∆T = 3), Figure 5 shows both the optimal
switching time t? (without receding horizon control) compared to the optimal
switching time t?? (with receding horizon control) in dependence of m (left),
and the profit growth with respect to the switching time for different learning
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rates (right). Again, the computations are based on a simulation of 120 time
units. Here, we observe that the impact of receding horizon control decreases
for lower learning rates.
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Fig. 5 Optimal switching time t? and t?? with respect to the parameter m (left) and
earning growth with respect to the switching time t? for different values of m (right).
Hence, the results infer that especially firms in high learning industries,
e.g., technology-based industries, benefit most from applying the proposed
receding horizon scheme.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the impact of the contract period on supplier
development. In particular, we showed that the supply chain partners’ incen-
tives to commit relationship-specific resources, i.e. to invest in cost reduction
efforts, critically depends on the length of the contract period.
Given the fact that long-term contracts entail certain risks, we proposed a
receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible contractual hazards. In
addition, we showed that dynamically extending contracts enhances the sup-
plier development process, because value generation is facilitated while both
the manufacturer and the supplier gain flexibility due to shorter contract peri-
ods. Furthermore, we presented two strategies in order to make the proposed
receding horizon scheme, cf. Algorithm 1, applicable even if negotiation costs
are taken into account.
Finally, we verified the reliability of the application by performing Algo-
rithm 1 for an extensive parameter set and demonstrated that receding horizon
control leads to a significant profit increase within the supply chain. Moreover,
by means of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the learning rate, we showed
that especially firms in high learning industries benefit since supplier develop-
ment programs play a predominant role in order to optimize the cost structure
of the supplier network.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
In this section a proof of Lemma 1 about the interplay of the contract period T and the
optimal switching time t? is given.
Proof Let the monotonic function z : t? 7→ 1+ωt? be defined, which maps the switching
time t? to the state x(t?) at the switching time t?. Furthermore, note that z′(t?) = ω holds.
Then, the switching condition (9) can be rewritten as
(T − t?)z(t?)m−1(a− cM − c0z(t?)m) = −2bcSD
mc0
. (16)
Clearly, the left and the right hand side are positive (m < 0). While the right hand side
is independent of both T and t?, the left hand side can be interpreted as a function of the
switching time t? for a given contract period T . Let f : [0, T ]→ R≥0 be defined by
f(t?) := (T − t?)z(t?)m−1(a− cM − c0z(t?)m).
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Then, the term −f ′(t?) · z(t?)m−2 is a sum consisting of the positive summand z(t?)(a −
cM − c0z(t?)m) and
(T − t?)ω · ((1−m)(a− cM − c0z(t?)m) + c0mz(t?)m) .
Here, it was used that a− cM − c0 − r > 0 holds. Hence, we investigate the term
(1−m)(a− cM − c0z(t?)m) + c0mz(t?)m (17)
in order to determine the sign of the second summand using that (T − t?)ω > 0 holds. To
this end, the supply chain profit p := a− cM − c0 > r > 0 per unit plays a major role: (17)
equals
c0 · ((1−m)p/c0 +mz(t?)m) + (1−m)(c0 − c0z(t?)m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
because m < 0 and t? ≥ 0 hold. Positivity of the first summand is ensued from (10). Hence,
(17) is positive and, thus, f ′ is (strictly) decreasing.
In conclusion, the left hand side of (16) is strictly decreasing in t? and strictly increasing
in T . As a consequence, using T , T > T , instead of T , i.e., considering the optimal control
problem on a longer time horizon (contract period), leads a larger switching time t? in order
to ensure validity of the switching condition (9). uunionsq
